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Research Study

The Communist Party of Italy:

An Analysis and Some Predictions

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THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF ITALY: AN ANALYSIS AND SOME PREDICTIONS

This paper reflects information available through mid-June 1975. In its preparation the author consulted other offices of the Central Intelligence Agency and the Department of State as well as recognized academic authorities. Their comments and suggestions were appreciated but no coordination was sought. Further comments will be welcomed by the Office of Political Research [redacted]

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INTRODUCTION

More than most communist parties the Communist Party of Italy (PCI) poses problems for analysts who try to categorize it. There are those who subscribe to the "Trojan Horse" theory that every major move of the PCI is dictated by the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) and that such differences as may appear are designed by the CPSU to push an overt image of a democratic world communist movement which, in fact, remains completely under CPSU control. At the other end of the spectrum is the belief that the PCI is totally independent and perhaps shouldn't even be called a Marxist party. The Party *is* unique, but it's not enough to say that its uniqueness lies in the degree of its "independence," the "Italianate" nature of its ideology, the sheer size and diversity of its membership, or any other single factor. The reasons are all of these and more; the whole explanation is greater than the sum of its parts.

It is not only the western analyst who has problems understanding the PCI; the CPSU and the communist parties of Eastern Europe seem to be equally perplexed.* In the fifties a middle-echelon Soviet official [redacted] was asked about Soviet competence in assessing trends in western Europe. He said that Soviet expertise and understanding were increasingly sophisticated except on Italy, which the Soviets found difficult to understand. In 1974, the official [redacted] PZPR (Polish Workers Unity Party) [redacted] said that a major difficulty which the PZPR and the CPSU had in understanding the PCI stemmed from the "fact," in his view, that the PCI wasn't really a communist party at all. He commented irritably that it was difficult to get on the same wave length with a party whose qualifications for membership seem non-existent: "Membership in the PZPR or the CPSU is something to be striven for. There is a probationary testing period before the applicant is accepted into full Party status. How can you even find out the real significance of a published figure of 1.2

*The Communist Party of China has no problem. For it, the PCI is clearly a bourgeois, Establishment, party. However, the Chinese obviously welcome actions by the PCI which cause problems for the CPSU in the international communist movement or for the USSR in its push for greater influence in western Europe.

[redacted]

million or 1.7 million members when the PCI will take in anyone who pays a membership fee? This is not the sort of communist party I'm used to."

This paper will try to give a feel for the PCI as an organization which, particularly after the successes registered in the June 1975 Italian regional elections, seems likely to play an ever more substantive role on the Italian and European scenes over the next several years.*

PRINCIPAL CONCLUSIONS

The Nature of the Party

An increasing number of non-PCI voters, politicians, industrialists, clergy, and even government ministers consider the PCI to be a force for stability whose collaboration is not only desirable but vital in coping with the economic and social malaise which afflicts Italy in the mid-seventies.

In ideology, makeup, strategy and objectives the PCI differs markedly from other communist parties. The Party is numerically strong and increasingly influential in regional and national government policy formulation; nevertheless, it faces problems in holding the allegiance of the conservative (or "orthodox Stalinist") and "new left" portions of its base. Its approach to these strains is flexible and non-doctrinaire and differs very much from that of the French Communist Party (PCF) to similar problems in the PCF.

The organizational and personnel changes made during the March 1975 XIVth Party Congress were designed by Secretary-General Berlinguer to increase his personal control of the PCI. The downgrading of Armando Cossutta, long considered to be the CPSU's strongest ally in the top PCI leadership, is significant. Berlinguer's pragmatism and other aspects of his personal management style will be increasingly felt in the planning and implementation of major PCI policies.

The PCI and the CPSU

Ideological and programmatic differences with the CPSU go back to the twenties. PCI ideology represents a substantive modification of Marxism/Leninism which CPSU theoreticians have never been able to accept. The XIIth Congress of the PCI in 1969 marked an official exposition of many of these differences which went beyond Togliatti's earlier policy statements on the necessity for each national party to pursue its own road to socialism.

During the Allende regime the PCI and the CPSU differed sharply in their analyses of the dynamics of the Chilean situation.

The CPSU has suspended frontal attacks on PCI "heresies" in the interest of maintaining a degree of influence over the European com-

munist movement and the European Left in general. This public accommodation papers over a continuing CPSU distrust of the PCI leadership.

The PCI and Western Europe

Pan-European Institutions: The PCI has long had high-calibre members in the European Parliament. It has favored Italian membership in the European Community (EC) and has itself had high-level contact with EC components. Although PCI control over the largest Italian trade union confederation (CGIL) is by no means total, it has pushed hard for CGIL entry into the European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC) in order to enhance PCI influence in European labor. The CGIL application was approved in 1974, marking the first entry of a communist-dominated trade union into the ETUC.

Portugal: Long before the March 1975 events in Lisbon, the PCI took a jaundiced view of Cunhal, the Portuguese Communist Party (PCP) leader, fearing that he would push for a leftist authoritarian government on the east European model. In the developing Portuguese situation, Berlinguer's public criticism of the PCP and his favorable attitude toward the Portuguese Socialists may lead to an open rupture between the PCI and the PCP. Although the PCI would prefer to avoid this, it may well decide that a break is necessary if this should be deemed a pre-condition of the Party's acceptance by the Italian Socialists and the Italian DC as a partner in government.

Spain: The PCI is pleased that the CPSU is mending its fences with Carillo, long a favorite of the PCI because of his continued condemnation of the Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia, his willingness to be an interloculator for the PCI with Peking and his advocacy of a pluralistic society in post-Franco Spain.

France: Giscard's razor-thin victory in the 1974 presidential elections was the ideal outcome for the PCI, which had feared a close Mitterand victory and consequent inability of a left coalition government to function in the face of a hostile French Parliament. Such an eventuality would have adversely affected the chances for any eventual PCI entry into government. The Communist/Socialist relationship in Italy is quite different from the relationship of these parties in France. This, plus other basic differences between the PCI and the PCF, militate against any close permanent rapport or common program and go far to explain why the French and Italian communists follow different internal and foreign policies.

The PCI and the United States

The PCI's view of the United States is still dominated by its conviction that Italian foreign and domestic policies are largely decided in Washington and implemented through the DC, whose dominant center and rightist factions are believed to be controlled through the American Ambassador. It thinks that the US is committed to forestalling meaningful PCI influence at the national level and is prepared to use the CIA to abet a rightist coup if such is considered necessary. The leadership also believes, however, that there is now sufficient coincidence of views among the PCI, the Socialist Party, all of the left (and some of the center) factions of the DC, and large elements of the middle classes to make it impossible for any rightist coup to succeed.

The PCI, aware that its earlier anti-NATO stand was a basic obstacle to improved relations with potential coalition partners, a few years ago decided that it would not oppose continuing Italian participation in NATO should the Party enter the government. From a policy of "Europe without blocs" it has subtly changed to a policy of *equidistanza* ("equidistance") between the US and the USSR, and recognition that the blocs will not disappear in the near future.

The unexpected size of the PCI gains in the June 1975 elections means that Berlinguer's line will prevail within the Party. However, a harshly critical US posture toward the PCI might well force Berlinguer to change his position to avoid the formation of an anti-Berlinguer faction within the leadership.

The PCI in Government

If the PCI entered the government it would follow a relatively moderate line on internal domestic and social policy which, in many

cases, would be to the right of Socialist Party positions. It would drive a hard bargain with the DC to ensure that the Party had a voice in the administration of the giant parastatal enterprises which are largely the preserve of the DC and which are a dominant feature in the economic life and the foreign policy of Italy. It would *not* advocate further nationalization. It would not push for radical social and economic reforms unless it were convinced that it enjoyed the support of a substantial element of the middle classes—and of a good portion of the DC at all levels. The evidence—overt and covert—points to the leadership's commitment to a pluralistic society and to the parliamentary system.

The PCI, in consonance with its overall "Eurocentrist" policy so criticized by the CPSU, would use its influence within the government to try to strengthen the EC and the European Parliament. The objective would be the creation of a more unified Europe more independent of American influence. Worried lest such a policy might also lead to increased Soviet influence in Europe, the PCI leadership would find it easy to approve NATO demarches involving the USSR in cases such as a Soviet military intervention in a post-Tito Yugoslavia. In cases where Italian national security interests might not be clearly involved (as in a Soviet-inspired blockade of Berlin), the PCI would probably not go along with a tough, retaliatory action recommended by the NATO command—but it would probably find itself in the company of a majority of the Italian Parliament and a good portion of the DC in taking such a stand.

DISCUSSION

I. ORIGINS OF DIFFERENCES WITH THE CPSU

An understanding of the nature of the PCI has to begin with a realization that its ideology represents a substantive modification of Marxism/Leninism which CPSU theoreticians have never been able to accept. Antonio Gramsci, the principal founder of the PCI in 1921, probably owed as much to the Italian humanist philosopher, Benedetto Croce, as he did to Marx, Engels, and Lenin. Gramsci was the secretary of the Italian Socialist Party in Turin before the Bolshevik Revolution. Although the Revolution certainly inspired him, he was primarily concerned with developing a theory of socialism applicable to Italian conditions. A well-read intellectual, Gramsci was aware of the extent to which pre-war Czarist society and the Russian tradition of authoritarianism were conditioning factors in CPSU ideological formulation and its program for the world communist revolution; he felt it would be a mistake to transplant CPSU organizational methods and goals to the highly articulated, Catholic, Italian society. Despite the more revolutionary Leninism of some of Gramsci's early rivals, Italian communism of the twenties was largely cast in the Gramsci mould by 1924 when he had won control of the Party. Successive leading figures of the PCI, some of whom were Gramsci's fellow students at the University of Turin, by and large shared Gramsci's view of the necessity for what Togliatti was to call "the Italian Road to Socialism."

Antonio Gramsci

Antonio Gramsci—Principal founder of PCI in 1921 and its leader at the time of his imprisonment in 1926. Influenced by Marx, Engels, Lenin—and Benedetto Croce.

The history of the twenties is full of incidents showing Stalin's deep-seated distrust of this "Italian Road."* Within the Comintern, Togliatti (a member of the Comintern's Executive Committee) and the PCI were targets of vitriolic attacks, occasionally by Stalin himself but more usually by spokesmen for his views: Thaelmann and Ulbricht of the German Communist Party, Kuusinen of the Finnish Party, and Manuilsky of the CPSU. Gramsci, who had been imprisoned when the PCI was banned by Mussolini in 1926, was kept informed of these disputes. Despite the Stalinist pressures, Togliatti and other PCI leaders, even in the intimidating atmosphere of Stalinist Moscow, seem to have retained a measure of ideological and organizational independence. This was not accomplished in any atmosphere of cordiality or sweet reasonableness.

Those concessions which the CPSU wrung from the PCI in Moscow appear to have been made by Togliatti or Tasca (a PCI representative in Moscow) only when it appeared that the PCI stood in danger of eviction from the international movement

*This section draws heavily on discussions with Professor J. B. Urban, author of what is perhaps the best analysis of the period based on research in CPSU and PCI archives: *Italian Communism and the "Opportunism of Conciliation," 1927-1929.*

Palmiro Togliatti—Gramsci's successor and leader of PCI from 1926 until his death in 1964.

if it persisted in opposition. The action which probably provoked Stalin more than any other was the PCI stand in the argument in the late twenties over the extent to which a communist party should advocate socialist pluralism and/or democratic objectives except as a purely tactical move in the context of a rapidly developing situation where revolutionary takeover of power was still the short-range objective. The substance of the PCI argument was that a post-Fascist democratic government in Italy would not, as Stalin feared, bring about a return of Fascism. Togliatti felt that a traditional type of democratic government would be necessary in order to pave the way for the eventual establishment of a socialist order, which itself would require the collaboration of large elements of the non-communist Italian society. In the ideological debates within and outside the Comintern in Moscow on this general subject, Tasca of the PCI wound up by making a speech to the PCI Central Committee in 1929 in which he criticized not only the Comintern's assessment of the world situation but Stalin's domestic economic policies as well. CPSU pressure forced the PCI to expel Tasca and publicly to disavow his statements. But the PCI's basic line had not changed. As Togliatti said at the time—in the Galileo tradition: "If the Comintern says it isn't right, we will no longer posit it (but) each of us will think these things and will no longer speak of them."

Indeed, barring arguments for revolutionary action in the factory councils of Turin in the early days of the PCI or the brief period of militancy in 1947, the PCI has been consistently "reformist" rather than "revolutionary." Each time the CPSU policy line has moved to the "liberal" side, as during the Popular Front period of the mid-thirties and the war-time coalitions of the early forties, the PCI has been out in front. In other periods of crisis for the CPSU and the international communist movement when the CPSU has reasserted its traditional, "orthodox" dogma, the CPSU has devoted special attention to the PCI and has attacked its advocacy of "socialist pluralism." This deep-seated suspicion of the PCI continues and in 1971 was forcefully stated by S. Kovalev, the hard-line CPSU theoretician, who propounded the Brezhnev Doctrine at the time of the Czech invasion. Kovalev equated

Luigi Longo, Secretary General of the PCI from 1964 to 1972. Now President of the Party.

proponents of socialist pluralism with the Czech revisionists and attacked "certain fraternal parties" for believing that opposition parties might continue to exist under socialism.

This basic conflict has had its 1975 manifestations in the attitudes of the CPSU and the PCI on the developing Portuguese situation. Berlinguer's closing speech to the XIVth PCI Congress in March 1975, commenting on the events in Lisbon of that month, stressed the PCI's advocacy of a pluralistic society and criticized the Portuguese government's banning of the Portuguese DC. More recent developments have seen the intensification of the dispute. The Portuguese communists have publicly proclaimed a forthright Stalinist position and the PCI is publicly denouncing them. The CPSU has privately criticized the PCI and, using the French Communist Party as its mouthpiece, has made this criticism public.

II. THE PCI ELITE—HOW THE LEADERSHIP FUNCTIONS

"Getting ahead in Italian communism seems to require an early start, a university education and hard work."* This judgment, made in 1971, is still valid. The PCI leadership by tradition is heavily intellectual and its origins middle or upper middle class; e.g., Togliatti, Longo, Berlinguer, Napolitano, Ingrao, Bufalini and many others. Even where the class origin has been the peasantry or the industrial proletariat there is almost always a university background. Gramsci himself is an example—a child of Sardinian peasants, he went through the University of Turin on a scholarship. (By contrast, the PCF leadership has usually come from the working class, e.g., Waldeck-Rochet, Marchais Thorez, Duclos.) Throughout their Party careers the PCI's top leaders continue to keep up to date on the points of view of other parties and groupings. National and provincial leaders can be described as "broad gauge" as opposed to their more "provincial" French counterparts. Themselves open to the problems of all classes, they read widely in economic and political journals and in the foreign press. The PCI Headquarters, for example, gets *Foreign Affairs, The New York Times,* the *Rome Daily American* as well as the leading western and eastern European journals and papers—and the Headquarters leadership reads them. At the local level, surveys indicate that three-fourths of the local PCI politicians read in the non-communist press. (Only one-third of the local French communist officials do so.)*

PCI officials state that the CPSU official of today is more sophisticated than his predecessor of the fifties. However, there is still a lingering intellectual contempt on the part of some PCI officials for the CPSU *apparatchik*, which, to some extent, is a heritage of Togliatti's treatment by the CPSU in 1929. This often comes out in the form of statements like "the Russians don't understand Italy, don't understand western European trends, and therefore don't understand us." There is another, less publicly acknowledged, reason for this PCI attitude: the PCI leadership is aware that detente gives the CPSU a good excuse for cutting the PCI out of discussions on global or European problems, where the PCI feels it can and should make substantive contributions. In January 1972, for example, there was an international conference in Brussels to which the CPSU sent a delegation headed by Vadim Zagladin, Deputy Chief of the CPSU International Department. The PCI delegation included, among

*See Annex "A" of *Red Power and Prospects in Italy.*

*There have been several recent good studies on the behavior and attitudes of PCI and PCF local officials. One of the best is an unpublished appraisal by Professor Sidney Tarrow of Yale University (*Party Activists in Public Office—Comparisons at the Local Level in Italy and France*). Tarrow's work forms part of a series of studies to be incorporated in a book scheduled for publication in late 1975 by Princeton University Press.

others, Giorgio Amendola from the Politburo, Segre, and a PCI economist, Eugenio Peggio. The PCI delegation left Rome for Brussels early

Although the PCI's air of intellectual superiority sometimes annoys other communist parties, it has had some positive fallout for the PCI in Italy. The PCI's elite doesn't hesitate to point out to interlocutors from other Italian parties the extent to which its political, economic and social sophistication is vastly superior to that of the CPSU.

This degree of candor tends to have the effect, at the top levels of non-PCI political and economic power, of softening the impression of the PCI as a Party which is run out of Moscow. A few years ago, Father Giuseppe De Rosa, who analyzes the PCI for the authoritative Jesuit journal *Civilta cattolica*, stressed that this image of independence, competence and sophistication was a strong selling point for the PCI in its attempts to break down the concept of the PCI as a satellite party of the CPSU.

Concrete evidence of the legitimacy of De Rosa's point is continually seen today.

Sergio Segre, former secretary to Luigi Longo and now Chief of the PCI's Foreign Section.

Father Giuseppe De Rosa, expert on the PCI for the official Jesuit publication *Civilta cattolica*. He believes PCI increasingly successful in breaking down its former image as a Soviet-controlled party.

A. The Leadership's Management Style

Despite occasional appearances of disunity at the top, the PCI leadership is fairly well disciplined.* Once a particular line has been laid down as policy by the Secretariat the leadership closes ranks and works to get that line accepted at all Party levels. Soviet and east European communist analysts, as well as western observers, often tend to construe the occasional open divergence of views of PCI leaders on Italian TV or in press interviews as indicating a lack of "democratic centralism" and/or as proof that the Party is so "wide-open" and changed as to longer warrant the label "communist." Although PCI officials rarely use the term "Leninist" any more in describing the Party's organizational theory, democratic centralism does operate to a considerable extent. There is certainly no organized faction of the base or the leadership which is out to challenge Berlinguer's leadership or to force a shift in his policies in any major way. The PCI does tolerate a much greater range of public and private dissension than is permitted in any other communist party, with the possible exception of the Yugoslav party of a few years ago, and regional federations on occasion have refused a Headquarters request for assignment of a local official from regional to national Headquarters. Top and middle echelon officials can and do grumble a lot to each other when they feel a private ox is being gored too much, and the decible count of these complaints can get very high. (They *are* Italians, after all.)

[redacted]

but the discipline in implementation of policy is usually exemplary. It is certainly immeasurably greater than can be found in any other Italian political party.

The leadership is able to maintain this functioning unity for three basic reasons: first, during more than fifty years the post of Secretary-General has been held by only four men and transfer of power has always been accomplished in a smooth and orderly fashion, thus avoiding the sort of top-level infighting which has occasionally troubled the PCF; second, the basic philosophic and programmatic content of the PCI's "Italian Road to Socialism" has been preserved virtually intact over the years; finally, the PCI management style is characterized by great flexibility.

This flexibility derives from the leadership's awareness that Italy, despite more than a hundred years of formal unity, is still a highly fragmented country. The PCI decided in the early forties to permit considerable autonomy to provincial and regional federation in following varied tactical

*Before the March 1975 XIVth PCI Congress, the leadership was composed of a Secretariat of 7 members, a 19-man Politburo, a 37 member Directorate and a Central Committee of 208 members. All Secretariat members were also members of the Politburo, all Politburo members were on the Directorate, etc. The small Secretariat has its own staff and is in semi-permanent session. The Politburo, which was abolished in the reorganization announced at the XIVth Congress, had not met as often as the Secretariat, but was perhaps more important in terms of being the top-level governing board at which disparate views were aired and ironed out to form the policy "line" of the Party on a given issue.

routes to increase influence within their local jurisdictions.

The policy of a delicate balance between central control and local autonomy is supplemented by a policy of not permitting individual senior officials to establish local power bases as so many faction leaders in the DC have done. Segre, with a Turin background, was told by the leadership in 1972 to run for Parliament from Bari, a city in the impoverished south.

The choice was nevertheless consistent with the Party's desire to avoid the *clientelismo* and factionalism which could easily materialize if deputies continued to represent the same district term after term.

lower and middle section officials feel free to complain to the leadership about aspects of overall PCI policy which may be having a negative effect either locally or within a functional jurisdiction.

Potential problems in the formulation or execution of Headquarters policies are often nipped in the bud by the constant travel between Rome and the provinces by provincial and Headquarters officials (including Secretariat members and Berlinguer himself). Such travel is also a morale builder in the sense that the local organizations are aware that the "bureaucracy," as local officials often refer to the Rome Headquarters, is open to their problems and views.

Berlinguer's philosophy and personal management style: For months before the XIVth PCI Congress well-founded rumors were circulating within PCI Headquarters that Berlinguer was "too indecisive" and put excessive reliance on getting advice from various Party directing organs before making decisions. Berlinguer was aware of the reputation he was acquiring and, at the Congress, carried out changes he had long wanted in order to achieve tighter personal management of the Party:



Enrico Berlinguer, Secretary General of the PCI

he abolished the Politburo and made some key personnel shifts in the ruling Secretariat. The abolition of the Politburo seems to have been motivated by Berlinguer's belief that it was there that he had been most often put under pressures by "old guard" conservatives such as Armando Cossutta and Giancarlo Pajetta.* The new Secretariat is typified by officials such as Renzo Trivelli, who has a history of working effectively with non-communist parties on regional problems, has accompanied Berlinguer to Moscow, and seems to share Berlinguer's desire to lay out realistic policies which can be implemented in the Europe and Italy of today.

Berlinguer's removal of Secretariat member Cossutta, long a key man in the top levels of the Party and the only PCI leader for whom the Soviets have had a kind word in the past five years, was a bold move and the rather brusque manner in which it was carried out shows a newly-found self-confidence on Berlinguer's part.** This self-confidence received another boost following the massive increase in PCI votes in the recent elections and leads to the conclusion that the Party leadership will carry Berlinguer's personal stamp much more in the future than it has in the past.

Although Berlinguer is described as "pragmatic" by PCI officials and by non-PCI officials who deal extensively with the Party, he is not without clear philosophical or strategic concepts. His writings, speeches, and private conversations all point to the sincerity of his goal of a pluralistic, socialist, Italian society in which the PCI will be a major, but not necessarily even the pre-eminent, political force. To attain that objective he believes that the PCI must persuade the DC (as the major political force in Italy) of the wisdom and necessity of a leftward shift in the conservative policy of the current Fanfani leadership so that there can be meaningful collaboration with the PCI at all levels; the i.e., "conditioning" discussed in the next chapter but formalized and carried much further to result in the "historic compromise." He thus rejects the concept of a "hegemony of left forces" or the "union of the left" which forms the basic rationale for the "Common Program" of the PCF and the PSF in France.



Renzo Trivelli and Gianni Cervetti. Two newcomers to the policy-making Secretariat following Berlinguer's reorganization of the Party's leadership at the XIVth PCI Congress in March 1975.

*It was also the Politburo which conservatives such as Pietro Secchia used as the forum for arguing pro-CPSU doctrine in the days of Togliatti. The new Secretariat has a much weaker umbilical cord to the "old days" when the CPSU had its high-powered proponents in the Party's hierarchy.

**Despite Cossutta's initial expression of bitterness at the short notice he received that he was being removed from the Secretariat, he told a trusted Party colleague that "personal questions are now closed and it is up to individuals to support the policy of the Party." It's significant that Berlinguer obviously still regards Cossutta's ability—and basic loyalty—sufficiently highly to have since given him the important post of Section Chief for Regional and Local Affairs in the Party Headquarters.

III. THE PCI's "CONDITIONING" POLICY

In 1975 the PCI clearly considers its reformist goals and its parliamentary strategy to be responsible for the Party's impressive electoral record and the success of its conditioning efforts on Italian governmental policies. (The word most often used by PCI officials [redacted] of the tactics and strategy of the PCI is *condizionamento*—"conditioning" of DC—dominated governments toward adoption of policies favored by the PCI.) To understand how this conditioning works and the goal it is designed to achieve, it's worthwhile examining the manner in which the PCI has operated as a parliamentary party for over a quarter century.

A. The PCI as a Parliamentary Party

The nature of PCI participation in the parliamentary system is quite different from that of the French Communist Party (PCF) the only other mass communist party with a long history of representation in a parliamentary democracy.* Throughout the Fourth Republic and even during the earlier Popular Front of 1936, the PCF seemed uncomfortable in its parliamentary role; it was *in* the parliament but not *of* it. The PCI, on the contrary, has worked skillfully—one might almost say "happily"—within the system and has played the parliamentary game in a manner more reminiscent of a labor party than of a Marxist/Leninist party. There seems nothing remotely similar in the French experience. The ease, frequency, and, above all, *intimacy*, of day-to-day contact between the communists and other parties on the business of government just don't exist in France. For the past several years for example, PCI members of the Budget Commission in the Chamber of Deputies have been shown preliminary drafts of the budget in advance of its formal parliamentary presentation by the Budget Minister. Their comments are solicited and differences of opinion ironed out before the presentation to ensure that the PCI will not block the budget's passage in the Chamber. Discussions between PCI deputies and other party politicians are held on substantive issues such as Italian aid programs in Africa. These conversations take place in public—not only in the various commissions of the Chamber but also in Chamber cloakrooms or in restaurants; [redacted] DC members of the Foreign Relations Commission and of other commissions in the Chamber exchange views with, and get advice from, PCI deputies on a variety of issues ranging from fiscal and labor policies to the situation in Portugal.

Outside—and supplementary to—parliamentary exchanges, informal conditioning takes place directly with key government officials. [redacted]

*The Chilean Communist Party was in Parliament for several years prior to Allende's overthrow in 1973. During this period it functioned more in the PCI tradition than in that of the PCF. The Finnish Party has also had a long history of parliamentary representation but the peculiar nature of Finnish-Soviet relations and the split within the Finnish Party into liberals and conservatives make it difficult to draw appropriate analogies.



Deputy Prime Minister Ugo La Malfa and PCI Directorate Member Giorgio Amendola during a round table discussion.

Francesco Cossiga, DC member of the Cabinet in current Moro government.

This unique manner—"style" is perhaps a better word—in which the PCI has operated over the years at the national level as a legitimate and powerful "out" party raises an interesting psychological question: To what extent has the PCI policy of "conditioning" left its mark on the PCI's elite? Put another way, has the PCI been conditioned as well as conditioning? History seems to show that groups with a militant ideology find it very difficult to maintain their militant identity for long once their elites have a stake in the system. It would be a mistake to assert flatly that PCI representatives in Parliament and PCI members who occupy elective and administrative posts as mayors or regional or municipal councilors are losing their identity as Marxists; however, the long-established pattern of openness to collaboration and compromise seems to have had a decidedly diluting effect on their militancy. This possibility is something that bothers many of the PCI rank and file, and is discussed below.

IV. WHO JOINS THE PARTY AND WHY

Consistent with Togliatti's understanding that no radical transformation of Italian society was pos-

sible without the collaboration of broad segments of the population in an almost totally Catholic Italy, the PCI has been a mass party since the end of World War II, with about 1.7 million members in 1975. In the national elections of 1972 it received a little over nine million votes, or 27.2 percent of the total. In the regional elections of June 1975 the Party received 33.4 percent of the total, or 5.5 more than it got in the 1970 regional elections. It has now 179 of the 630 seats in the Chamber of Deputies (i.e., two-thirds of the number held by the Christian Democrats and about as many as held by all other parties combined). Before the June 1975 elections it administered—in most cases in collaboration with the Socialists—three of the 20 regions of Italy (the so-called "Red Belt" of Tuscany, Umbria and Reggio-Emilia), 12 of the 94 provinces and about 20 percent of all municipal councils. To achieve this range of popular support it has opened its ranks to persons who never would have been considered by Marx, or Lenin—or Brezhnev—to be candidates for Party membership in an advanced industrial society. Only half of the PCI membership comes from the industrial working class for example.

In the forties and fifties Italian and other western analysts of the PCI tended to emphasize either poverty or alienation as the prime reasons why Italians joined or voted for the PCI; i.e., the PCI vote was a "protest" vote.

[redacted]

it is clear that the sociological makeup of the PCI electorate is not radically different from that of the DC electorate. Both run the gamut from low to high income, education and status. At times of economic upturn and increased prosperity the PCI vote has risen at a pace not substantially different from that shown in periods of economic recession. If one applies education and income factors there is an even more striking display of the inapplicability of the old *Lumpenproletariat* school of analysis of communist voting patterns. Reliable studies of the late sixties and early seventies show that Italian voters who have low incomes and no education beyond elementary school tend to vote for the DC and parties of the right; voters with higher income and education levels tend to vote for the Italian left, including the PCI.*

Why do so many Italian join the PCI?

[redacted]

A. The PCI Role in the Resistance

Fascism and the realization that Mussolini's regime initially had broad-based support in Italy has left a traumatic mark on the Italians. The heavy partisan fighting in 1943-1944, particularly in the north, is something of which almost all Italians, with the exception of the neo-Fascist MSI/DN Party, are proud. "*La Resistenza*" has been raised to something approaching a religious symbol in present day Italy; many social psychologists believe that "the Resistance" is psychologically necessary for the Italians by way of exculpation of the national crime of Fascism. In this bitter partisan fighting the communists were in the vanguard. The majority of Italians today give high marks to the communists for their valor and leadership in the 1943-1944 partisan campaigns. Sporadic press articles or books highlighting incidents in which PCI partisans settled old scores with anti-German elements who were also anti-PCI don't seem to have had much effect in altering this image. (The ability of the PCF to exploit its role in the French resistance for political gain is not at all comparable. De Gaulle casts too long a shadow for the PCF to pre-empt the leadership role.) In 1975 the most effective rallying cry to guarantee the presence of several thousand people at a rally in an Italian piazza is still a slogan which involves the "ideals of *la Resistenza*." The prohibition of political groupings espousing Fascist programs or ideology is clearly spelled out in the 1948 constitution which governs Italy today. Some of the most effective men in power in the PCI joined the Party in 1943

*This paper draws on *Doxa* and *Demoskopea* polling results as well as on the writings of analysts such as Professor Sidney Tarrow. The most comprehensive study on this whole problem is probably "The Electorates of Non-Ruling Communist Parties" by Professor Thomas H. Greene in *Studies in Comparative Communism*, Volume 4, July/October 1971, pp. 68-103.

Italian soldiers marching in a demonstration in Milan 25 April 1975 in protest against "neo-Fascist" terrorism and coup preparations. They are masked to avoid identification. The banner reads "Fascist coup-makers! For you there is no tomorrow! We are soldiers and we shall be partisans!"

or 1944 when they were in their teens, including its leader Enrico Berlinguer. Equally important is the fact that many non-PCI partisans were comrades-in-arms or were allied with the PCI in the 1943-1944 negotiations for a republican structure of post-war Italy. Silvio Leonardi (one of the PCI's top economists, member of the Budget Commission in Parliament and member of the PCI group in the European Parliament) says that his high regard for La Malfa as a person and as a statesman goes back to the late thirties but was crystallized during the resistance. The reverse, also seems true; i.e., La Malfa and other non-PCI figures such as the President of the Chamber, Sandro Pertini, have an apparently genuine esteem for individual PCI leaders with a proved anti-Fascist background.

B. Fear of Fascist Resurgence

There is today in Italy a widespread fear that neo-Fascist elements are preparing a coup with the support of right-wing members of the security services and the armed forces. Although the chances of a successful right-wing coup are almost nil, a sufficient number of coup preparations have been uncovered by security organs and publicized in the press to fan a belief in the population that a very real threat exists. This belief was fueled when it was found that the spate of bombings and terrorist attacks, which began in late 1969, involved the far right more than the far left. Giulio Andreotti was Minister of Defense in the Rumor government of 1973-1974, and, as such, had ultimate jurisidiction over the intelligence service of the armed forces (SID) and its counterespionage arm. Andreotti pushed an investigation of SID for alleged pigeonholing of evidence pointing to the extreme right as the major instigator of Italy's wave of terrorism. The PCI, which had long been publicly advancing just this theory, now poses as vindicated in its initial judgments. An increasing number of non-PCI Italians give them a plus for this—and a corresponding minus to those DC officials who were so slow in coming to the same conclusion.

C. Competence and Dedication of PCI Officials

In a country where corruption and *clientelismo* are traditional and widespread, the PCI gets high marks among Italians for the honesty and efficiency with which its officials carry out their tasks in public administration. The examples of the Bologna municipal administration and the administration of other towns and regions under PCI-dominated councils are well-known. Indeed, in a time of chaotic municipal administrations in many DC-dominated cities, the effectiveness of PCI local administrations is rarely challenged, as the June 1975 election results attest.* Studies on the attitudes of local PCI politicians have concluded that the PCI mayor or regional councilor sees the well-being of his locality as the prime objective of his job.

*In April 1975, the newly-elected secretary of the Italian Republican Party, Oddo Biasini, [redacted] that he was upset by I[redacted] myth of good local PCI administration and referred to an interview for an Italian journal in which he had tried to correct this "myth." He cited waste in the multiplicity of useless PCI local entities and bureaucracy to the point where, he maintained, over 80 percent of the local administrations of Emilia-Romagna are heavily in debt. Also in April 1975 [redacted] the PCI-controlled tourist agency Italturist had serious financial problems which it was trying to solve with the assistance of Luigi Cesarini, an economics professor at Milan University. Whether PCI-administered local governments and firms are solvent or not is really beside the point, however. In the public mind PCI-administered organizations, whether governmental or business, are *not* characterized by the *clientelismo*, corruption and inefficiency with which the public tends to view DC-administered enterprises.

D. Responsiveness to the Mood of the Country

The PCI's image of modernity in the area of social mores and social legislation is proving attractive to an increasing number of formerly anti-PCI Italians who no longer buy all the traditional DC/Church doctrines. The classic example of this changed mood was the 1974 referendum on divorce. DC Secretary Fanfani, against the wishes of most of his advisors, as well as of many Vatican liberals, chose to succumb to pressure from conservative members of the Italian Council of Bishops and go to the country with a referendum on whether Italy should continue to permit divorce. (The existing law permitted divorce but under very restrictive conditions.) Although parliamentary devices existed to avoid a referendum and the PCI urged the DC to use them (fearing the inter-party and intra-party lacerations of a campaign on the issue), Fanfani was adamant. Once the issue was joined, the PCI went all out and campaigned with the PSI and other lay parties in favor of divorce. The only ally of the DC was the neo-Fascist (MSI/DN) Party. The DC and the MSI tried to depict the PCI as "anti-family" and to turn the issue into a party-political one. The result of the referendum was a resounding victory for pro-divorce elements and a shattering defeat for Fanfani personally and for the DC as a party. Most analysts (including those in the PCI) do not interpret the results as a massive vote of confidence in the PCI and/or Socialists, but rather as an opportunity which many Italians took to get across the message to the Church and the DC that Italian society wanted to move with the times. However, the PCI feels that its positions on divorce, women's rights (it has a higher percentage of women in Party and elective posts than any other major party), lowering of the voting age, and other social issues may translate into more votes for the Party, or at least force the DC to move leftward in its own programs.

Reinforcing the PCI's image of modernity in the area of social mores is its stand on the crushing problems of housing, transportation, schools, hospitals, and bureaucratic and tax reform. Even respected Italian commentators known for their distrust of the PCI have acknowledged that relentless PCI pressure has been a major impetus for most of the progressive reforms of recent years.



Two powerful PCI officials of the "Red Belt"—Renato Zangheri (Mayor of Bologna) and Guido Fanti (President of the Emilia-Romagna Region).

The tax reform campaigns of the PCI find an appreciative audience among lower and middle classes; the more sophisticated in this audience increasingly note that the PCI has done its homework when it proposes specific solutions to this and other problems. The most effective nitty-gritty solutions advanced in 1974 for making order out of chaos in the Italian postal system were those of PCI parliamentarians and the PCI official organ *l'Unita*—and were so recognized by many DC officials in private and by some non-PCI journalists in the press. And, at a time when the issue of hospital reform is a front page item about once a week in the national press, an upper-class DC woman who lives in Piacenza confided that she goes to a hospital in Bologna "because, you know, even though it's run by communists it has the best medical care; and it's so well administered."

E. The Law and Order Issue

In an era of increasing crime in Italy, the relative freedom from crimes of violence in PCI-admin-

istered communities is being noted. As one anti-PCI [redacted] commented in 1974: "In Rom[redacted] bank robbery about every day. Last year there were no bank robberies in Bologna and no incidents of violence in street demonstrations."

[redacted] The PCI denounces violence regularly in its press. All this tends to improve the Party's image of respectability among sections of the population and the government which have traditionally feared "the Reds."

V. THE PROBLEMS IN THE BASE—DEALING WITH THE RANK AND FILE

Despite its impressive electoral showing and its influence within the government—and to some extent *because* of these factors—the PCI leadership continues to have problems in getting the base of the Party to comprehend its strategy and to endorse it. The "historic compromise" is simply not understood by many rank and file Party members—or even by some local PCI leaders. Depending on their point of view, many members of the base feel it is either a sellout to the bourgeois Establishment, the beginning of a neutralist policy vis-a-vis the Soviet Union, or proof that the Party has become a stagnant bureaucracy indistinguishable from that of the CPSU. This problem of how to maintain the allegiance of the "Stalinist" and "new left" elements of its base while persuading potential coalition partners of its "responsible" nature poses a major challenge to the flexibility and pragmatism which characterize the Berlinguer leadership. Berlinguer was made personally—and acutely—aware of this early on. At the XIIIth Congress of the PCI in March 1972, speaking from a prepared text to over one thousand delegates from all of Italy, he outlined the PCI's program for "an alliance of all progressive forces—communists, socialists and Catholics—to achieve the transformation of Italian society." He paused for applause. It came, but only in a most perfunctory manner. Berlinguer, a good orator but without any particular demagogic style or flair, then inserted "but it is the PCI which must remain in the leadership of this battle." This is what the delegates had come to hear and they were on their feet roaring approval. Another incident of more recent vintage: At a March 1975 meeting of the Trastevere Section of the PCI in Rome, the local leaders tried to explain the intricacies of the "historic compromise" to members by way of preparation for the XIVth Congress later in the month. A woman in the audience listened patiently for a time and then said, "There's a word one almost never hears any more in our party—and that's 'revolution.' Whatever happened to our revolution?" Such attitudes reflect the basic stresses within the rank and file and the extent to which these strains affect leadership policy today.

A. Allegiance to the CPSU—The "Orthodox"

There are no reliable statistics on the number of PCI members who believe that the PCI should be less liberal and more orthodox, but the usual yardstick of 20 to 25 percent seems not far off the mark. One must distinguish between those who are orthodox—"hard-line" in terms of the internal policies to be followed by the PCI in gaining power—and those whose orthodoxy is focused more on the extent to which the PCI should be more closely linked to the CPSU in its foreign policy. Obviously there is a large overlap; most of them probably agree, for example, that Berlinguer and the leadership should stop making public statements that the PCI would not advocate Italy's withdrawal from NATO even if it were to come to power at the national level. They are also confused by such statements as that of Central Committee member Nilde Jotti at the February 1975 Congress of the Vicenza PCI Federation that "the PCI favors the political unification of Europe without American *or Soviet interference.*" (Emphasis added.) Since 1944 the PCI rank and file members have had drummed into them the propaganda that the USSR is the motherland of communism, that it supports democratic revolutions all over the world and that it is in the vanguard of popular forces aimed at stopping American imperialism from dominating Europe. It is very difficult for them now to accept any criticism—no matter how implicit—of the CPSU on the part of their local and national leaders. The national leadership, aware of this, has usually been careful to insert statements of gratitude for, and praise of, the CPSU in policy statements enunciating the deter-

mination of the PCI to follow its own path to socialism. The great majority of the base, interested in the Party's getting into national power to the point where it can better implement its objectives, seems willing to buy its leadership's explanations as to why the parliamentary and the democratic way is the only way this can come about. But there are some in the hard-core orthodox group of the base who remain unconvinced, and the leadership is troubled as to how to handle the problem except by continual and subtle emphasis on the wisdom of its policy in the peculiar conditions of present-day Italy.

B. The New Left

Although the PCI leadership publicly minimizes the threat of the "New Left" it has privately been very disturbed by the problem and how to deal with it. This is somewhat surprising given the fact that "New Left" elements have not done well electorally, getting only 1.6 percent of the vote in the June 1975 elections. The leadership's concern and the reasons for it are worth examining because of their implications for future PCI strategy in Italy and Europe.

By the beginning of 1968 there were many in the PCI's elite who were already complaining that traditional PCI and traditional CPSU philosophies were not attuned to the currents of the sixties in Europe. The Hungarian, East German, and Polish uprisings in the 1950s had led to considerable intra-Party debate and discussion at all levels. Some Party figures were having problems with their teenage offspring, who felt the PCI and the CPSU were ideologically and organizationally sterile bureaucracies. The universities and high schools were in a state of ferment and a kind of populist sentiment was in the air. With this background 1968 saw three major events which have left an indelible mark on the PCI: (1) the "Prague Spring" of Dubcek—the rise of "Communism with a human face"—which was enthusiastically welcomed by most of the PCI leadership and base, not always for the same reasons. (2) the "May revolution" in France, culminating in the events at Nanterre and lesser revolts in Italian universities, appeared to many to presage a unique alliance among communists, students and workers to begin to change "the system." Then came the PCF decision to back the French government's denunciation of the Nanterre uprising.* This action had its weaker counterpart in the comment by Amendola of the PCI Politburo to Italian students that "the days of going to the barricades are over." (3) The crusher was the Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia in August—Red Army tanks in Prague and the replacement of Dubcek by a reactionary regime which was manifestly the puppet of the USSR. A dominant theme in the Soviet response to the Czech situation was the CPSU's promulgation of the Brezhnev Doctrine, asserting the right of Soviet intervention in socialist countries whenever there is danger of a "counter-revolution."

During and after this watershed year of 1968, there were continual intra-PCI debates which culminated in the 1969 XIIth PCI Congress—one of the stormiest in PCI history. In terms of hierarchical position Politburo member Pietro Ingrao was probably the most influential adherent of the view that the totality of the 1968 events showed the necessity for rethinking the PCI's reformist policy. Both during and after the Congress it was a group of "Ingraoiani" who were the most articulate critics of a PCI leadership which they felt had failed to grasp the opportunity to channel the revolutionary sentiments in the European "New Left" toward a truly radical transformation of the traditional state apparatus. This group,

were also harshly critical of the CPSU's counter-revolutionary" actions in Czechoslovakia. After a long inner-Party trial they were expelled from the PCI. By all indications the Longo/Berlinguer leadership did its utmost to avoid this drastic action, but a combination of the group's stubborn refusal to recant on any major issue plus a great amount of CPSU pressure made expulsion unavoidable.

*Jean-Paul Sartre describes the PCF action as "saving French capitalism."

Rossana Rossanda, one of the leaders of the *Manifesto* group.

The group, which now called itself "Il Manifesto" and began publishing a daily newspaper by that name, formed an organization and an informal group of members in the national Parliament. Although it ran an independent slate of candidates in the national elections of 1972, the intricate Italian electoral system prevented it from translating its votes into any parliamentary seats. The group was thus wiped out in terms of formal political representation at the national level. However, it continued to have an influence strong beyond its numbers. In mid-1974 the Manifesto group disbanded and merged with the Party of Proletarian Unity to form a new party called the Party of Proletarian Unity for Communism which remains, however, basically Manifesto in orientation and appeal.*

*For simplicity's sake we shall use "the Manifesto" in referring to this party, particularly since this is still the way in which it is often referred to in Italy.

The other major extraparliamentary leftist group is known as *Lotta continua* ("The Continuing Struggle)," led by a thirty-three year old former PCI member, Adriano Sofri. It is more tightly knit than the Manifesto group and, like the Manifesto, eschews violence. It concentrates on proseletyzing in the armed forces and in the prisons; in the prisons it has been responsible for significant demonstrations with political overtones. The PCI regards *Lotta continua* more benignly than it does the Manifesto, and is optimistic that its members can be brought back into the Party.

Why has the top leadership been so worried about the Manifesto and *Lotta continua*? First, because they speak to the PCI membership in terms which the membership understands. They ridicule PCI claims to be a "vanguard" party and the Manifesto, particularly, does so in articulate and unusually clear Marxist terminology. For the most part Manifesto leaders are highly intelligent people with impeccable records of service to the PCI before 1969. They and *Lotta continua* have established contact with extraparliamentary groups in France, Portugal and other countries. Second, they appeal to the leftist youth of Italy. Third, the Manifesto's paper, *Il Manifesto*, is widely read, not only by the non-PCI Left but by PCI members.* Moreover,

[redacted] 1974 private copies of *Il Manifesto* were always in evidence in the large reading room of the PCI's Gramsci Institute, being passed from hand to hand. Similarly, at meetings of local CGIL unions copies are often avidly read by the delegates.

Ultra-leftist youth being arrested in Rome. The PCI is publicly and privately against leftist extremism.

despite its ideological and programmatic stance to the left of the PCI, the Manifesto publicly and privately condemns the terrorist use of violence by the "crazies" in some of the far-left splinter groups; i.e., it has successfully avoided being lumped with these groups at a time when "law and order" is of major concern to the great majority of Italians. (*Lotta continua*, because of its inability to control its left fringe, is less successful in this regard.) The concern of the PCI for the threat posed by the Manifesto group is perhaps best illustrated by the fact that *Il Manifesto's* criticism of some of the PCI leadership for early support of the "fascist" Fanfani for President (in 1971) forced the Party's leadership to drop consideration of Fanfani.

C. The Response to the Threats from the Left

The nature of the PCI response to these threats again shows the fundamental difference in temperament and organizational philosophy between the PCI and the PCF. The latter has shown cold hostility toward organizations, such as Alain Krivine's "Communist League," which have gained strength since 1968, and there is little evidence of a positive effort by the PCF to compromise with them and/or to keep in any sort of close touch with their elites. The PCI, on the other hand, is constantly thinking of how it can win back its lost sheep and, more importantly, how it can restructure its programs to recoup the prestige it has lost with the youth and the more idealistic of its base. During the XIIIth Congress of the PCI in Milan in 1972 Rossana Rossanda, one of the ex-PCI deputies in Parliament who had been expelled from the PCI because of her insistence that it become truly "progressive," frequently met with

Clash of two competing ultra-leftist groups in Milan, 1974.

several PCI delegates to the Congress.

Despite their disagreements on some items of principle it seems clear that the PCI and the Manifesto will cooperate and collaborate on items of common concern. The PCI eventually succeeded in getting *Lotta continua* support for PCI candidates in the June 1975 elections. Further, it is known that the PCI has not given up hope of "redefecting" most of *Lotta continua* and at least some of the more senior PCI apparat members who joined Manifesto.

Two aspects of the June 1975 elections give the leadership cause for satisfaction: extraparliamentary left groupings which ran candidates garnered only 1.6 percent of the vote, and, *much more important for the Party in the long run*, 50 to 60 percent of the newly-enfranchised youth (persons 18 to 21 who were voting for the first time) voted for the PCI.

D. The Response to the "Orthodox"

After the Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia the PCI leadership decided to test the reaction of its base to the event and found, that a significant number of the Party's base was sympathetic to the invasion "because the USSR must have had its reasons."

Obviously the vehemence of the open criticism of the CPSU by Magri, Ingrao, Rossanda *et al*, coupled with public evidence of extensive support by the PCI base for the Brezhnev Doctrine, would have put the Party in complete disarray. As it was, the PCI leadership had to suffer the loss of the Manifesto group on its left; to have been forced to deal at the same time with an organized pro-CPSU orthodoxy among its base in any concerted or programmatic fashion would have been beyond the capacity of even a Togliatti.

Thus the PCI leadership deliberately—and astutely—chose to avoid direct confrontation with the orthodox faction of its base.

[redacted]

rather it accentuated the positive advantages of the "Italian Road" in a society which is far different from the USSR—and a Party which therefore has to be different from the CPSU. At about the same time (1969-1970) the leadership intensified its efforts to educate the base on the necessity of viewing the PCI as essentially western-oriented—on the desirability of putting its international emphasis on its role in the west European labor movement, on improving the lot of Italians working in western Europe, and in identifying with "progressive" communist and non-communist political and social movements in Europe. In other words, the leadership, well aware of the dangers of trying too quickly to persuade its base that two generations had been "misinformed" regarding the true state of affairs in the CPSU and the USSR, did not criticize the CPSU in its propaganda directed toward its base, but began to stress much more directly the unique internal and external situations of Italy and Europe and the PCI's role therein. By late 1974 the CPSU had begun to attack this "Eurocentrism" with public criticism patently aimed at the PCI.

The leadership has been only partially successful in its efforts to retain both a tight organizational control within the Party and the image of a broad-based democratic parliamentary Party meriting the trust of the movers and shakers in the ruling DC and other Italian parties. DC Minister De Mita, in his comments cited earlier put the problem concisely when he stressed that it was no longer "ideological irreconcilability" but rather the PCI's foreign policy which kept it out of the government. The PCI is trying to cope with this by its policy shift on NATO and by increasing use of the phrase "equidistance (*equidistanza*) between the USSR and the USA" to describe its objectives for Italian foreign policy. The organizational problems with the conservative pro-CPSU faction of its base are quite another thing. The leadership probably will continue to follow a gradualist approach in hopes that the new generation of PCI members will not have the visceral affinity of some of its elders for the CPSU as the "guiding Party" of the international communist movement.

E. The "Centrist" Policy of Berlinguer and Its Difficulties

Berlinguer and his top-level associates had tremendous problems in drafting the lengthy policy statement read by Berlinguer to the Central Committee in December 1974. The document itself shows the problems created by the Party's simultaneously presenting itself as (1) a Marxist Party, (2) a Party adamantly opposed to disturbing in any way Italy's parliamentary democratic system, (3) willing to move with the currents of the New Left to avoid becoming an overly-bureaucratized communist party such as the CPSU, and (4) working for a policy of "equidistance" between the USSR and the USA. This document clearly tries to avoid antagonizing any particular faction within the Party. It is directed toward appeasing those Italians who still fear "revolutionary" objectives of the Party, and it is also designed to take advantage of the detente atmosphere in Europe by downgrading the Party's earlier anti-Americanism in favor of a pro-Europe policy which is neither anti-Soviet nor anti-American. Moreover, the Party in 1975 is prepared to take advantage of further deterioration in Italy's economic situation if a call should come for its help in keeping the country afloat to avoid a neo-Fascist takeover or total economic collapse. However, as discussed later, it will come into the government only when it is convinced that the DC is prepared to pay the price of a truly effective share in power at the national level. Its base, perplexed, is waiting.

VI. SCHIZOPHRENIA IN THE CENTER: Why so Many Influential Non-PCI Italians Think the PCI is a Factor for Stability

A. The Attitude of the Businessman

On 30 May 1974 Giovanni Agnelli, President of Fiat and a man with great political clout in the Italian Establishment, made a speech on the occasion of his assumption of the Chairmanship of Confindustria, the Italian equivalent of the American National Association of Manufacturers. He took a hard look at the seriousness of Italy's economic crisis, which included an inflation rate of 16 percent, a probable year-end balance of payments deficit of close to $1.3 billion, and a figure of 800,000 unemployed being swelled by the return

[redacted]

of Italian emigre workers from Belgium, Switzerland, France and Germany due to recessions there. He then proposed a new "pact" along the lines of the 1944 "Union for Salvation" to include the PSI, the DC and the PCI. According to Agnelli the country's stability depended on such a joining of political forces.*

Shortly after Agnelli's speech Dr. Gianluigi Gabetti, President of the Agnelli family holding company, told [redacted] that Agnelli's call for a new pact was not to be interpreted to mean that Agnelli favored admission of the PCI to the government. Rather it was an attempt to promote a dialogue among Italy's three major political groupings regarding the serious economic problems facing the country. Gabetti did acknowledge, however, that "there is sentiment among some in Italian business circles" for PCI participation in a national government.

Although Gabetti was obviously trying to reassure [redacted] there seems little reason to doubt his assessment of Agnelli's comments in the sense that Agnelli would like to see Fiat—and the DC—dialogue with the CGIL and the PCI on ways and means of maintaining employment while reducing inflation, but *without* PCI entry into government. He and most other major industrialists do not favor such PCI goals as increasing involvement of workers' councils in factory management—goals which would be easier to implement if the Party had a formal say at the Cabinet level.

Italian businessmen who are similarly torn on the issue were not helped by the initial PCI reactions to Agnelli's speech. Far from warmly welcoming his initiative, the first PCI reaction, by the outspoken Amendola of the Politburo, was "we're not patsies for the calls for help coming from industrialists like Agnelli. Our Party is ready to assume responsibilities on condition that there be a change in economic policy." Berlinguer followed a few weeks later by saying that the PCI didn't intend to commit suicide in order to pull DC chestnuts out of the fire.

Thus at top levels of industrial and governmental economic policymaking there is the desire to maximize the PCI contribution to stability and to the solution of Italy's economic crisis, but to do so without relinquishing any significant control of the governmental and parastatal apparatus, which is largely in the control of the DC and its adherents. The PCI, quite aware of this dilemma, is upping the ante for the help it can give and repeatedly states that it won't come into the government or even enter a "preferential relationship" with the DC at the national level unless it sees clear promise of a major policy change leftward on the part of the DC leadership.

Parallel to this public line of the PCI, the dialogue with Agnelli goes quietly on. It is a widely known "secret" among PCI officials that Agnelli for years has had private sessions with top officials in the PCI-dominated trade union confedera-

*A few months after Agnelli's "pact" speech, a West German loan of $2 billion permitted a breathing spell and led to a change in Agnelli's public attitude; at least he has not hinted again at the desirability of a PCI entry into the national government.

Giovanni Agnelli, President of Fiat. In May 1974 he called for a "union of the DC, Socialists and the PCI" to solve Italy's economic crisis.

tion, CGIL. It is further known and even occasionally mentioned in the non-PCI press, that Fiat contributes money to the PCI as well as to the DC and other parties at election time. How can this behavior be explained? It's not enough to dismiss it with "that's the way things are done *all'italiano*" or even to say that it's typical of the Italian propensity to hedge bets by contributing to both sides in an election campaign.

The rationale for Agnelli's wanting to keep on the good side of CGIL makes sense from the businessman's viewpoint. As an industrialist who is competing in local and world markets he has to be able to plan his labor, material and overhead costs in order to work out a pricing policy which will make Fiat competitive. He—and many other big and small industrialists—prefers to deal with the confederation (CGIL) which has jurisdiction over the greatest number of craft and trade unions. The intricate Italian process of negotiating annual labor contracts is thus at least simplified to the extent of dealing with one labor confederation rather than with many unions or federations. Further, the record of CGIL's honoring of its contract agreements is a good one and its current attitude on wage increases is relatively responsible.*

the PCI is making progress with small businessmen in gaining acceptance as a party capable of restoring stability at a time when the government's policies seem to them to be threatening their interests. Since the early seventies the PCI leadership has been beefing up the so-called *ceti medi* ("middle classes") section of PCI Headquarters. This section, assisted by senior officials from the PCI hierarchy, is increasingly active in trying to build bridges to the middle classes and enlisting their electoral and other support. In addition to intensification of routine propaganda programs to counter right-wing assertions that the PCI aims at further nationalization of private industry, the PCI has initiated contacts with regional and national organizations of small businessmen. For example, in late 1974 Luciano Barca, the PCI's top economist who heads the Party's section on Reforms and Programming, met with Professor Selan, President of the National Confederation of Small Industry, for discussions on how best to deal with the problems afflicting small business.



Luciano Barca, an important figure in PCI economic policy planning.

Although small businessmen and officials of chambers of commerce tend to echo Fiat spokesmen in assuring American interlocutors that they are not taken in by the PCI, they admit that there is much in PCI economic policy which appeals to them, particularly the PCI/Socialist quarrel with the government's high interest, tight money policy. Most enterprises in Italy are still of small size with under 50 employees. Many of these firms, living as they do from year to year and with no capital reserves, have gone out of business as a result of a combination of domestic and international inflation and the shrinking availability of low-interest money. The PCI's defense of this group's interest in Parliamentary debates, coupled with the sophistication of its economic arguments and the knowledgeability of its experts is a significant factor in increased acceptance of the Party as a stabilizing influence which defends the petite bourgeoisie caught in the wage/price spiral.

The foregoing indicates that traditionally anti-communist businessmen, whether they are major industrialists like Agnelli, or small businessmen, or officials of nationwide small businessmen's organizations, are increasingly squeezed: by turning to, or accepting overtures from, the PCI to help them out of their economic problems, they all know they may be advancing the day when the PCI arrives in the Cabinet and in positions of effective power in key parastatal and private industries. Their prime concern is not the prospect of nationalization of more of the private sector. State participation in, and even control over, major industries is not something new in modern Italian economic history; the corporate state of Mussolini, the post-war nationalization of the electrical power industry, the railroads and other industries and the proliferation of parastatal industries where private and public entities share in financing and management all provide recent precedents.

VII. THE PCI AND THE CHURCH

The PCI has consistently followed Togliatti's dictum: "Never engage in a frontal confrontation with the Church." A significant item in this context, sometimes missed in tracking PCI policy over the years, is the inclusion of the 1929 Lateran Treaty (between the Vatican and the Italian Government) as an integral part of the Italian Constitution of 1948: this would not have been possible without the support of the PCI. The Constitution contains the Treaty's provisions on canon law, such as the compulsory teaching of the Catholic religion in public secondary schools, the necessity for a religious ceremony before a marriage has civil legality, etc., which a PCI with pretensions to Marxism would have been expected to combat. Togliatti, in defending PCI support of the Lateran Treaty, recognized the extent to which Catholicism is part of the fabric of Italian society. For the PCI to adopt an adversary role would not only have been tactically unwise but would have been inconsistent with the PCI's goal of a pluralistic society embracing communists, socialists, *and Catholics.* What he played down in public statements was the obvious fact that many who voted for the PCI—and some who were members of the PCI—were practicing Catholics. His philosophy on this issue formed the basic rationale for Berlinguer's desire to avoid a referendum on divorce a quarter century later—i.e., avoid intra-Party and inter-party conflict on issues involving the Church.

One of the more shadowy figures in the PCI with influence on Berlinguer is Franco Rodano, a Catholic who is Berlinguer's principal adviser on PCI/Church relations. Rodano was close to Togliatti and developed a friendship with Berlinguer dating from the forties when Berlinguer was head of the PCI youth organization. Despite his excommunication by the Church in 1948 "for having put the ecclesiastical hierarchy in a bad light and for fomenting dissensions among the clergy" Rodano has always counseled the Party to maintain close and direct ties with the Italian Church and with the Vatican. Significant is his emphasis, in a 1974 article on "The Peculiarities of the Italian Communist Party," that "the only requirement the PCI statutes place on membership in the Party is that members support the PCI political program, with no reference to personal religious or philo-

sophical positions."* Although Rodano and Berlinguer have their differences, the evidence points to a coincidence of views on working with, and not against, the Catholics to achieve PCI tactical and strategic objectives. The reporter on the Church and the Vatican for *l'Unita*, Alceste Santini, rarely criticizes a Church stand on an issue; rather he plays up statements by individual "liberal" Catholic prelates which support PCI positions, leaving to the other lay parties (Socialists, Social Democrats, Republicans, and Liberals) head-on criticism of the Church on political/social issues.

Although it is difficult to nail down precise details of Church and/or Vatican thinking regarding the long-term status of relations with the PCI, it is clear that the basic position has undergone drastic modification since 1948. In the national elections of that year the Pope and the Church portrayed the PCI as the anti-Christ; to vote for it would be cause for excommunication. The political action arm of the Italian Council of Bishops, the so-called "civic committees," saw to it that this message got down to the smallest parish. Since that period, and particularly since Vatican II, a combination of a more liberal stance by the Church hierarchy and the Vatican's *Ostpolitik* have made it impossible for right-wing elements in the Church and the Vatican to launch any sort of comparable movement. The normalization of Vatican relations with Poland and Hungary, the use of PCI good offices in getting a message from the Pope to Ho Chi-Minh, DC/PCI joint efforts to get medical supplies to Vietnam in 1972, the disastrous results of the 1974 divorce referendum for both the Church and the DC, and many other events have muted the voices of those in the Church who want to carry on a frontal assault on the PCI. Criticism of the PCI in the official Vatican paper *L'Osservatore romano* and in *Civilta cattolica* is more and more

*"Le peculiarita del partito communista italiano" in the June 1974 issue of *Quaderni della rivista trimestrale*.

Monsignor Agostino Casaroli, Vatican Secretary of State, and principal architect of the Vatican's "detente" policy with the USSR and eastern Europe.

limited to reminding readers that the PCI is tied to an international communist movement led by the CPSU, which, in turn, is dedicated to the overthrow of many traditional Italian (and Catholic) concepts of the family and society; i.e., cautioning Italians not to be misled by PCI protestations that it is just another Italian political party.

The increasingly vocal criticism by some Italian clerics directed at the Church's failure to move more aggressively in achieving social justice in Italy has been paralleled, in the liberal wing of the Church, by clerics who openly proclaim their adherence to many of the stated goals of the PCI such as drastic revision of the so-called "family laws." More and more, priests are willing to lend their names and presence to PCI-sponsored meetings which explicitly condemn DC local and national policies of a conservative nature. A striking example of how the PCI and "liberal" elements of the Church are working together is the 1 March 1975 address by Monsignor Ernesto Pisoni at a meeting of the Milan Federation of the PCI. Pisoni stated that he was speaking in a private capacity but "through my person there is present here a Catholic world which has passed from a strategy of waiting to one of expectation. Many things divide us on the ideological plane but many things unite us. The great gulf is not between lay persons and Catholics but between the exploiters and the exploited." In effect his ten-minute speech seemed to be giving a Catholic blessing to the PCI's "historic compromise." His remarks led to Pisoni's being reprimanded by the Milan auxiliary archbishop and by an article in the Vatican newspaper allegedly directly inspired by Pope Paul. The furor stemmed not only from astonishment that a Catholic priest made such comments to a PCI Congress but from the fact that in the past Pisoni had always voiced strong anti-Communist sentiments.

Monsignor Ernesto Pisoni, who shocked Catholic conservatives by speaking at a meeting of the Milan Federation of the PCI in March 1975.

A followup article in a *Corriere della sera* affiliate referred to an upcoming trip by Pisoni to Moscow where he was to be received with honors normally accorded only high-ranking visitors. The article stated that Pisoni's trip was planned by his good friend Armando Cossutta, of the PCI's Secretariat, and concluded by saying that Pisoni was slated to play an important role in implementation of the PCI's "historic compromise" line. Cossutta has acknowledged privately that the press account is substantially accurate and that he is dismayed by the leak; but he also feels that it served to publicize a political victory: support by a Catholic Monsignor of PCI social programs.

What will be the future course of Church/PCI relations? The eased situation of the Church in Poland [redacted] the removal of Cardinal Mindszenty; the continuation of frequent Soviet-Vatican contacts, and other indications of give-and-take involving the Vatican's *Ostpolitik* and the USSR's detente policy, all point to continued improvement of PCI/Church relations. The PCI clearly does not hope for any official benediction from the Church; it is content to imply that individuals such as Monsignor Pisoni do this unofficially. What it does hope for is less involvement of the Church in future election campaigns—i.e., no return to use of "civic committees," messages from the pulpit, or other political action instruments. The June 1975 elections show that the PCI is correct in its assessment that this is a realistic expectation.



Berlinguer with Cardinal Ugo Poletti.

VIII. THE "HISTORIC COMPROMISE" AND THE PROSPECTS FOR ITS SUCCESS

A. The Concept and its Origins

Both within and outside the PCI there continues to be confusion over the meaning of Berlinguer's "historic compromise" formula. Indeed, Berlinguer may have deliberately kept the concept fuzzy to avoid being locked into a rigid formula which might have to be altered as conditions changed. He first publicized his theories in a series of articles written for the Party weekly, *Rinascita*, in the fall of 1973. What the sometimes obscure phraseology boiled down to was a conviction that the immobility of the Italian political situation required that the PCI and the DC, as the two major political forces, work more closely together to plan and implement economic, political and social policies required to cope with the country's problems. Changes in coalition partners of the DC over the previous 25 years had not been able to produce and execute the necessary "dynamic" programs because there had been a perpetual governing party (the DC) and a perpetual opposition party (the PCI). The country was becoming ungovernable in these circumstances, Berlinguer felt, and the time had come to rectify the situation.

Berlinguer and the PCI Secretariat are acutely aware of the problems of persuading the PCI base of the logic of the "historic compromise" without asserting a militancy which will frighten DC interlocutors away from further collaboration. Careful preparation was undertaken at all levels of the Party before its 1975 XIVth Congress to point out what the "historic compromise" is *not*. It is *not*, said Berlinguer and other Party leaders, an offer by the PCI to save the DC from past and present mistakes. It is *not* a move by the PCI to enter the government and occupy ministries just to become part of the Establishment. It is *not* a sellout of PCI principles. Above all, any meaningful collaboration with the DC at the national level will only occur when the DC has changed its conservative economic and social policies *and its current leadership*. Berlinguer made this last point most emphatically at the XIVth Congress when, to the dismay of many top PCI leaders, he leveled a personal attack at DC Secretary Amintore Fanfani for having used the Portuguese government's banning of the Portuguese DC as an excuse to pull out the DC observers who were attending the PCI Congress. The bombshell of the dissolution of the Portuguese DC, Fanfani's gleeful seizure of the incident as proof that, once in power, a communist party will move to reduce all other parties to insignificance or worse, and the fact that the Italian DC now had an issue to work with in the upcoming June 1975 regional elections, all combined to cause Berlinguer to lose his legendary cool.

Berlinguer's exposition of the "historic compromise" marks no real departure from the Gramsci and Togliatti tradition of "working with Catholics, socialists and communists." It is the tactical shift which is important—and the tactical change appears primarily motivated by PCI analysis of the events which led to the downfall of Allende in Chile. Before 1973, tactics in moving to increase the Party's power at the national level had been a rather vague mixture of working with the PSI and with left factions of the DC while pitching their electoral and propaganda themes at a "union of the left" objective. This latter policy, sometimes known as "the fifty-one percent" formula,* had Giorgio Amendola as one of its principal spokesmen. It is based on the belief that, if such a grouping could somehow get cohesive representation in Parliament and in the GOI, the PCI would finally have access to the levers of power proportionate to, if not greater than, its numerical strength. Although many PCI officials supported this program, Ber-

*Because it is assumed that the PCI plus the Socialists and left elements of the DC and the Social Democrats constitute a majority of the electorate.

linguer has always seemed sceptical. A main objection, in his view, was that ultimate success of such a program would require a *de facto* split within the DC and he has long felt that a strong DC is essential to the stability of Italy for the indefinite future. To force a split would mean that a major chunk of the right wing of the DC, *faute de mieux*, might well make common cause with the neo-Fascists in the interest of survival as a political force. The fear of this is very much in the thinking of the top PCI leadership—as well as of center and left-of-center DC officials such as Prime Minister Moro.

Until the March 1975 Portuguese events the ground was being somewhat prepared for ultimate acceptance by the DC of formalized collaboration with the PCI through a series of *mini-compromessi*, as the Italians called them, at the local level. In late 1974 and early 1975 there was evidenced an increasing willingness on the part of DC municipal administrators to enter into more formalized relationships with the PCI in communities where the DC, on paper, controlled the administration. In three major cases of this sort (Venice, Avvelino and Agrigento) this collaboration was undertaken with the realization that it was against the policy of Fanfani who had explicitly stated that the DC would not tolerate local or national power-sharing with the PCI. Many of the DC local administrators who entered into such relationships later either resigned under pressure or were expelled by the DC national secretariat.

Although the National Council of the DC in January 1975 gave what the DC official organ *Il popolo* described as "support by 80 percent of the delegates" to Fanfani's policy of no deals with the PCI, the other side of the coin is perhaps more significant: that 20 percent of the DC hierarchy publicly condemned Fanfani's policy and that some key DC officials such as Prime Minister Moro were less than enthusiastic in their support. The DC Youth Organization was so explicitely and acidly critical of Fanfani's stand that he was reduced to expelling several of its top officials.

B. Chile as a Factor in th "Historic Compromise"

The publication of Berlinguer's *Rinascita* articles coincided with a detailed analysis of the rise and fall of Allende's *Unidad Popular* written by Renato Sandri, the PCI's Latin American expert, for the Party's theoretical quarterly.* This coincidence was not accidental. The Chilean Communist Party (PCCH) and the Chilean Christian Democrat Party had just gone down the drain with Allende. Sandri had some hard-hitting criticisms of the Chilean socialist leader, Altamirano, for the uncompromising manner in which he had put ultra-leftist pressure on the PCCH leader, Corvalan. Sandri quoted, with obvious disapproval, the public letter from Altamirano to Corvalan of February 1973 wherein Altamirano urged Corvalan to resist "any sort of temptation to reach agreements with petit bourgeois groups such as the Christian Democrats." Given the great concern voiced by the Italian DC as a Party, and by the GOI over the military coup

Ciriaco De Mita, leader of a left-wing faction in the DC Party and frequently a minister in DC-dominated governments. He has disagreed with Fanfani's prohibition of DC/PCI collaboration in local governments.

*See "Cile: analisi di un'esperienza e di una sconfitta," *Critica marxista*, September-October 1973, pp. 15-39.

which had led to the banning of the PCCH and the neutralization of the Chilean Christian Democrat Party, the PCI and some DC officials were singing a duet in their concern that "it can happen here." One should not force the analogy but there are some striking parallels which are not lost on the PCI and the DC: Allende and Corvalan were both preempted on the left by the socialist Altamirano, who made it increasingly impossible for *Unidad Popular* to work with Frei and other Christian Democrats. Similarly, in Italy it is the powerful left-wing of the Socialist Party (PSI) which makes what the PCI calls "irresponsible" demands for wage increases, price reductions, unionization of the police, etc., at a time when austerity and stabilization measures are called for. The PCI and some leftist DC politicians fear that ultra-rightists in the DC, the neo-Fascists MSI/DN and the Liberal Party are in touch with conservatives in the Italian military and security services to trigger a rightist military coup a la Pinochet.*

C. The Impact of Portugal on the "Historic Compromise"

The banning of the Portuguese DC has certainly set back the timetable for effective implementation of the "historic compromise" as long as Fanfani calls the shots in the Italian DC.** It is doubtful that the Portuguese events will stop for long the continuing trend of DC/PCI collaboration at regional and local levels of the sort described above. Even at the top levels of the DC there does not seem to be complete agreement that the Portuguese events should be read as being applicable to the Italian situation. The reasons involve both internal DC power plays and sincere differences of opinion among the DC hierarchy.

Foreign Minister Mariano Rumor was somewhat taken aback by Fanfani's ostentatious withdrawal of DC observers to the XIVth PCI Congress. Rumor, who heads the International Christian Democrat Movement and is among Fanfani's rivals for power within the DC, was almost certainly as well-informed as anyone within the DC about the nature of Portuguese developments. His "surprise" at the speed and severity of Fanfani's action may well have stemmed from a belief that Fanfani's attempts to link the PCI with the Portuguese communists as groupings which cannot tolerate a pluralistic democracy might cause an Italian voter backlash. Many in the DC's top leadership must be mulling over the fact that, despite Fanfani's efforts to exploit the Portuguese situation for electoral advantage in Italy, the PCI reached new heights in voting strength in June 1975. It would appear too, that Berlinguer's openly friendly attitude toward Mario Soares, the Portuguese Socialist leader, and the hardened position of the PCI toward the anti-democratic nature of Cunhal's ideological and programmatic approach lend credibility to the PCI's consistent statements of the necessity for a pluralistic society.

D. Prospects for Success of the "Historic Compromise"

Berlinguer and other Party spokesmen have repeatedly indicated that the PCI is in no rush to achieve more formalized and more substantive power at the national level.

[redacted] said, in early 1974, "the PCI will never come into a coalition with the DC in an arrangement which gives us the Ministry of Posts or the Merchant Marine Ministry and that's all. We don't expect the Foreign Affairs portfolio—or Defense—or Interior. What we would want, as a minimum, would be several ministries with responsibility and power in the economy and in social legislation, including Labor, State Participation, and one of the "money" ministries (Budget, Treasury or Finance). More to the point, we want appointments to the parastatal entities such as the

*The Government of Italy has not formally recognized the present Chilean government and is not likely to do so in the foreseeable future. Recognition would go against the wishes of most DC and PCI members. It would almost certainly cause the Italian Socialists (who hosted a March 1973 visit to Rome by Altamirano) to cease their support of the present Moro government—support which is vital to the coalition's survival.

**The 28 July 1975 election of Benigno Zaccagnini to replace Fanfani as Secretary of the DC makes it probable that Berlinguer's insistence that the Portuguese and Italian situations are worlds apart will find a more sympathetic official reception within the DC. Zaccagnini is from Emilia-Romagna and has won the respect of the PCI because of his popularity there. The pro-PCI daily *Paese sera* states that Zaccagnini's election "is frankly simpatico to us."

Amintore Fanfani, implacable opponent of the "historic compromise" and Secretary of the DC until July 1975 when he was removed because of the losses suffered by the DC in the June 1975 regional elections. He will remain, however, one of the influential figures in DC policymaking.

Italian Hydrocarbon Entity and Montedison. That's where effective power is and that's where the DC has run Italy like its private property for thirty years."

Is the DC prepared to pay this price? Obviously not now. Even though Deputy Prime Minister La Malfa (a Republican) and some DC officials state openly their conviction that the PCI of 1975 is not the same as the PCI of 1945, there is sufficient suspicion of how the PCI would act in a coalition to make the DC unwilling to invite it into a formal

Benigno Zaccagnini, newly-elected Secretary of the DC Party.

power-sharing role. Aside from this ideological factor there is the hard political reality that some DC officials and voters would bolt the DC if such a move were made. And the PSI and Social Democrats, realizing that their influence dwindles drastically if the two giant parties are, *de facto*, running the country, would oppose it. (This despite the fact that a strong minority within the PSI hierarchy aggressively promotes PCI entry into government.)

If the "historic compromise" formula is not likely to result in PCI presence in a coalition government within the next two years, is there going to be any real change in the way the PCI has gone about "conditioning" Italian policies over the years?

Giulio Andreotti, one of the most influential leaders of the DC. He has been building bridges to the Left, including the PCI, since 1974. Some PCI leaders have privately voiced confidence in him as someone with a "realistic" approach to working with the PCI.

In other words the PCI, recognizing that the "historical compromise" at the top is not possible in the short run, will try to create sufficient working examples of its efficacy at lower levels to lead the DC hierarchy to accept the validity of its application at the national level.

IX. PCI FOREIGN POLICY

A. Introduction

It is a truism in Italian politics that events outside Italy are reacted to by Italian political parties primarily in the context of their impact on the parties' power position within Italy. The PCI is often not included in this context, but it probably should. Its desire to maintain a maximum degree of independence from the CPSU consistent with retention of membership in good standing in a loose "international communist movement" causes it to join with the Yugoslavs and the Romanians in asserting the right of national communist parties—ruling or non-ruling—to pursue their own paths to socialism. This stance tends to blunt charges that it is a CPSU puppet. The Party applauds Dubcek's "Prague Spring" and denounces the Warsaw Pact invasion. It cheers the overthrow of the Caetano regime in Portugal but criticizes the heavy-handed approach of the MFA and the statements of Cunhal on the abolition of "bourgeois democracy." It exploits the shock of the DC at the overthrow of Allende in order to make common cause with the PSI and the DC in ensuring that Italy does not recognize the Pinochet regime. Where it can, it works with, rather than separately from, the DC in coordinated criticism of American policy in southeast Asia or Latin America. It has found it easier to establish a dialogue with the German Social Democrats (SPD) than with the West German communists or the PCF on common approaches to regional solutions to Europe's problems, and is pleased to see the extent to which this is noted in Germany and Italy.

Aware of the fact that its ties to the "international communist movement" and to the CPSU are the prime obstacle to acceptance by the DC as a potential coalition partner, the PCI, in its public and private statements of policy, puts emphasis on the necessity for the GOI to formulate an *Italian* foreign policy which will be less subject to domination by the US. The Party links this argument to an overall objective of an Italy and a Europe which will not be under either Soviet or US hegemony. To implement these short and long-range strategies the PCI uses not only a Foreign Section well-staffed with area experts but draws heavily on senior officials and other experts as

appropriate for trips abroad on geographic and functional problems—another indication of the Party's flexibility and pragmatism. When, for example, the Party sent a mission to the Middle East in early 1974 to get the facts on oil pricing policies it wasn't Foreign Section members who went but rather Giancarlo Pajetta, the PCI's senior Arab expert, and the Party's top economist, Luciano Barca. If it's a question of examination of how the EC is working, Berlinguer himself may talk to an EC Commissioner, as he did in 1974 when he and Segre went to Brussels.

Significant in any analysis of PCI foreign policy is the fact that there is regular, informal, exchange of views with DC Party officials both within the various government ministries and within the DC Party apparatus. It should not come as a surprise to read DC Deputy Fracanzani's January 1975 blast at the "clearly imperialist logic" of US foreign policy when it is known that Fracanzani's trips to North Vietnam in 1972 and to Lisbon in mid-1974 were discussed with the PCI in advance.*

B. Chile and Portugal as Factors in PCI Foreign Policy

Chile

From the first days of the *Unidad Popular* (UP) the PCI was careful to emphasize the pluralistic nature of the UP and even the right of anti-UP political groupings to exist and to propagate their views. While PCI analysts were occasionally critical of Altamirano and of the MIR and other ultras on the left, particularly after the Pinochet coup, they also spoke favorably of the manner in which disagreements within UP components showed "a real pluralism," as opposed to tactical "frontism." What comes through in the CPSU analyses of Chile is the fact that Soviet theoreticians right up to the end of the Allende regime were talking about the necessity of communist domination in any coalition as being vital in the "transitional" period en route to true socialism. The PCI, on the other hand, approved the pluralistic democracy which prevailed and objected primarily to the manner in which the left Socialists were pushing for measures which could not fail to alienate the middle classes without whose support the UP government could not last.

When one cuts through the Marxist verbiage of CPSU and PCI wrapups on Chile written *before* the Pinochet coup, it is this emphasis on the necessity of middle class support for programs of radical social change and the desirability of genuine pluralism which marks the fundamental difference of approach in the analyses of the Soviets and the Italians. Since the coup, the CPSU has repeatedly and specifically endorsed the need to win middle class support for CP objectives but CPSU doctrine clearly views this as a tactical move in the overall strategy to gain communist control of the state apparatus. Both during and after the coup, PCI analysis stressed the desirability of non-communist support and collaboration as something necessary not only in any "transitional" phase but *even after* the eventual transformation of the society to one which is structured on a socialist basis. It can be argued that this is a minor nuance; for the PCI leadership and theoreticians, however, it is a critical and fundamental point of departure with traditional CPSU doctrine. This difference is consistently present throughout the history of the PCI and is especially marked in the mid-seventies as the PCI attempts to make common cause with the DC and other Italian parties to capitalize on the Chilean experiment and to neutralize the impact of Portugal.

Portugal

Long before the Spinola revolution of April 1974 the PCI had had a jaundiced view of Cunhal, the Portuguese Communist (PCP) leader. The early PCI fear that Cunhal, if he attained a position of power, would push for an authoritarian government on the East European model has been amply vindicated by the events since March 1975.

The June 1975 Italian election results notwithstanding, the PCI is being put into an increasingly difficult position, however. If it persists in its anti-PCP line and if the Portuguese Socialists are banned, it may be forced to an open rupture with the PCP. The PCI certainly wishes to avoid this, but if such action were to be a condition of its

*Fracanzani is a member of the DC group on the Foreign Affairs Commission of the Chamber of Deputies.

acceptance by the Italian Socialists and the Italian DC as a partner in government it might well decide that a break is necessary. Such a "break" could take the form of an open broadside condemnation of the PCP's internal policies leaving it to the PCP whether such a condemnation would cause the latter to break off party-to-party relations.

We cannot here go into the intricacies of CPSU actions and reactions to the developing Portuguese situation.

Neither in the short nor the long run is this criticism likely to cause the PCI leadership to change its mind. The Party will refuse to be lumped into the same category as the Portuguese Party: if it recanted to please the CPSU and its own "Stalinists," it would violate its ideological doctrine and torpedo its hopes of entering the government.

C. PCI Policy on Spain, France, and Germany

Spain

The PCI has always been close to the Communist Party of Spain (PCE) but relations became much warmer after 1968. When the split between Carillo and Lister began to develop, the PCI showed its clear preference for Carillo—a preference which was primarily based on the strong anti-CPSU stand which Carillo took from the beginning in reaction to the Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia. The continuing statements by Carillo on the necessity for each Party to follow its own path to socialism and the degree of moderation shown by Carillo in his non-dogmatic approval of "socialist pluralism" are right down the line of PCI philosophy. The PCI also approves of another bold move of the PCE: its contacts with the Chinese Communist Party (CCP).*

A key aspect of the PCI's judgments on other PC's is the attitude those parties have toward the EC. It approves the PCE stand, taken in 1972 in Bucharest by the Eighth Congress of the PCE, that the PCE, while opposed to Spanish membership in the EC as long as Franco is around, would change its policy in a post-Franco era and "look forward to cooperation with other leftist forces to create a 'socialist Europe'."

However, even more significant for the PCI was Carillo's statement in Bucharest that the PCE would work for a socialist Spain where there would be "respect for the plurality of parties and the renunciation of any attempt to impose any official philosophy."

The CPSU, until October 1974, had been hostile to Carillo, branding his call for a democratic and socialist Europe as "reeking with nationalism." In October 1974, however, fences were purportedly mended during a PCE visit to Moscow where Carillo talks with Mikhail Suslov and Boris Ponomarev produced a communique wherein the CPSU tacitly gave up on Lister and promised to promote an improvement in relations with the PCE of Carillo "even when different points of view exist on certain questions." The PCI interprets these developments as signifying a realization on the part of the CPSU that a continued hard stand against Carillo's approach to Spain and Europe would only tend to further reduce the influence the CPSU has with European CP's and the European Left in general.

France

Relations between the PCF and the PCI have warmed up in recent years but, for reasons dis-

*In October 1971 the PCI paper *l'Unita* publicized the visit to Peking of a five-member PCE delegation headed by Carillo. Segre privately stated at the time that the PCI had asked Carillo to take soundings in Peking regarding the CCP's willingness to establish party-to-party contacts in Rome with the PCI. Although Segre says Carillo brought back a "no comment" from Peking, the PCI was grateful for his gesture and will probably continue to hold this channel (plus the Romanian CP) in reserve if and when they decide to make another try at PCI/CCP contacts.

cussed earlier in this paper, the parties are still quite different in their programs, styles and objectives. A conditioning factor has obviously been the peculiar relationship between the PCI and the DC in Italy which has no counterpart in any PCF/UDR contact. The French Socialists are the more influential force in the "Common Program" of the French Socialists and the PCF; the reverse is true in Italy where the PCI is much stronger than the PSI. The intellectual arrogance of the PCI toward the PCF has always been resented by the PCF, but the situation has improved to the extent that the PCF, in the PCI view, is becoming more sophisticated in its attitudes toward pan-European institutions such as the EC which it used to denounce but now somewhat grudgingly approves.* A series of Brezhnev-Marchais, Brezhnev-Berlinguer and Marchais-Berlinguer meetings in 1972 led to apparent agreement to bury the hatchet and to work together better in the interest of all parties. Differences and distrust between the PCI and the PCF appear too deep, however, to permit a fundamental reconciliation in the near future.

These basic differences again surfaced during the XIVth PCI Congress with the PCF delegation complaining bitterly about the PCI's criticism of the Portuguese communists, calling it "interference" in the affairs of a "sovereign" party. To this Giancarlo Pajetta of the PCI's Secretariat replied in late April 1975 with a pointed blast: "Marchais tells us 'you were wrong to interfere in the PCP's affair!' But what is Marchais himself doing to clarify this position if not interfering, and quite heavily at that, in the proceedings of our XIVth Congress *and in the political line we are formulating.*" (Emphasis added.)

The PCI was much worried in the days before the French presidential elections in 1974 lest the "Common Program" of the PCF/PSF be successful. It felt that if Mitterand were to win it would be by the narrowest of margins and a government formed on the basis of such a close result would be unable to carry out any positive programs in the face of a hostile French Parliament. The close victory of Giscard was the ideal outcome for the PCI. It was relieved at the knowledge that it would not be handicapped by the example provided Italian voters of a PCF presence in a coalition which could never govern effectively. At the same time it could capitalize on the election results by saying to the Italian electorate: "Twelve out of twenty-five Frenchmen want the communists in the government."

D. The PCI and Pan-European Institutions

A major thrust of the PCI's western-oriented strategy is expansion of its influence in pan-European institutions such as the European Parliament, the EC and the ETUC. The motivation for this push is a belief that a strong more autonomous western Europe is indispensable to correction of the evils of the present situation, which the PCI views as dominated by the strains between the various European nationalisms on the one hand and a dangerous combination of economic power in the hands of multinational firms and US economic, military and political hegemony on the other. The Party's view is that a more autonomous Europe must be also more open to expressions of popular will.

To this end the PCI fervently supports Prime Minister Moro's belief that there should be direct elections to the European Parliament. The PCI is quite sure that such elections would result in greater overall European communist, socialist, and left DC presence in the Parliament than there is today. A corollary of the call for direct elections is the desire to see the European Parliament have greater legislative authority and influence over the Council of Ministers and the EC. PCI contacts with other parties—including the Italian DC and other Christian Democrat parties in the European Parliament—are aimed at getting support for the objective of a more united Europe as a counterpoise to both American and Soviet power. As Berlinguer put it in March 1975: "The Party must encourage agreement between all the popular and democratic forces in Italy and west Europe whatever their opinions may have been and may be (now) about the origins and developments of the policy of blocs. The PCI, as the party which is the upholder of the interests and ideals of the Italian working class, is the most attached to the cause of Italy's safety, autonomy, and revival in the *framework of the revival and hence the increased role of the whole of west Europe.*" (Emphasis added.)

The European Parliament

The PCI has long had high-calibre representation in the European Parliament. From the outset it sent a good mix of well-known senior officials such as Giorgia Amendola and highly qualified "technocrats" such as the economists Eugenio Peggio and Silvio Leonardi. These PCI deputies do their homework on the gut problems of energy, exchange rates, EC/CEMA contacts, emigrant labor, the problems of the multinationals, etc. Over the years they have earned the respect of the non-communist members of the European Parliament for this reason, plus the non-polemical tone they use in discussing these issues in the Parliament, and in its working committees, and Leonardi has won

Eugenio Peggio, PCI economist and member of communist group in the European Parliament.

election within the Parliament to the post of Vice-Chairman of the Energy Commission.* The PCF, by contrast, has only recently begun to send officials to the Parliament who have the breadth and sophistication to hold their own in any except polemical discussions. It will probably be some time before they achieve the stature of the PCI deputies.

The European Trade Union Confederation

From the early seventies the PCI has worked to gain admission of the largest Italian trade union confederation, the PCI-dominated CGIL, into the ETUC. After an intricate series of maneuvers the CGIL was able to reduce to "associate" status its affiliation with the Soviet-dominated World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU) at the WFTU Congress in Bulgaria in 1973. This action, plus lobbying within the ETUC by some allies within the DC-dominated Italian union grouping (CISL) resulted in CGIL acceptance by the ETUC in 1974—the first admission of a communist-dominated union into the ETUC. Although the French communist-dominated confederation (CGT)—now seems to want to enter the ETUC, the PCI does not appear to be pushing very hard to help out. The PCI has long felt that its WFTU membership has not advanced the well-being of the Italian worker or the PCI objective of playing a major role in western European labor. At the same time, it is aware that many western unions take a dim view of the presence of the CGIL within the ETUC and the PCI has admonished the CGIL to act "responsibly" in its dealings with ETUC members.

The European Community

The PCI has devoted much study to the EC and the role it plays and can play in Europe. Since there are no PCI members at high levels of the EC bureaucracy, it works through non-communist officials in the Italian government who are either in the EC bureaucracy or have dealings with it. There does not seem to be any effort to "subvert" the EC to communist ends, but rather to do what is realistically possible to "condition" EC decisions and to keep Italians and non-Italians who work in the EC increasingly aware of the "reasonable" nature of PCI positions, of continuing PCI interest in the well-being of the EC, and in the upgrading of its effective European influence.*

*In late 1974 in a discussion of the EC, a non-Italian, non-communist EC official stated that "in European Parliament political debates by far the best prepared, best informed and reasonable speaker is Silvio Leonardi of the PCI. His views and pronouncements, reflecting profound advance research and a deep knowledge of economics, are taken seriously by others from left to right in the Parliament's political spectrum."

*One of the PCI's key points of contact within the EC is Altiero Spinelli, the EC Commissioner for Industrial and Technological Policy. Originally in the PCI, Spinelli left the Party before 1950 and joined the PSI where he was an advisor to Pietro Nenni. He has maintained good relations with many PCI officials, including Berlinguer, Amendola and Leonardi. In late 1974 Berlinguer, Amendola and Segre met with Spinelli in Brussels and came away with the feeling that he was favorably disposed to the PCI's objective of getting non-PCI support for its goal of strengthening EC institutions and the role of communists in them.

X. THE PCI, THE CPSU, AND THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNIST MOVEMENT

An increasingly prevalent view among western observers of the CPSU and other communist parties holds that the term "international communist movement" is not appropriate in the seventies. Analysts in this group think the term is no longer applicable in its implications of anything approaching an organization with some sort of fountainhead of effective executive power. Despite what has been said throughout this paper about the "Italian Road to Socialism" and the ideological and programmatic differences between the PCI and the CPSU, there is, nevertheless, an organizational internationalism involved in the thinking of the PCI which is very important to the Party. This internationalism still has its focus in Moscow. The PCI, after all, does have pretensions—more than any other Italian political party—to an international and pan-European program. It is careful to keep in formal and informal touch with the CPSU, which remains the ruling Party of the most powerful state in the communist world. On the many occasions for inter-Party conclaves such as anniversaries of individual communist parties or regional conferences of one sort or another, and through bilateral contacts, the PCI is able to keep in touch with the various currents of the "movement." It is continually getting a reading on the extent of resistance of the Yugoslavs to Soviet pressures in particular sectors of policy, the situation in Czechoslovakia, the broad range of "leftist" experimentation in Latin America and Asia, the CPSU reaction thereto, etc.

The attraction of the USSR and the CPSU for some of the PCI's base is a problem in terms of the PCI's approach to achievement of power within Italy as discussed earlier; at the same time it is a source of strength for the Party in the sense that each member knows the Party—regardless of differences with the CPSU—has a powerful ally as interested as the PCI in prevention of US hegemony in Europe. The intangible factor of morale cannot be ignored in this context: PCI members, whether in the base or hierarchy, feel more comfortable knowing that they are part of an international fraternity which has its family quarrels of varying intensity but which rarely sees a member leave the fraternity as the Yugoslavs were forced to do in 1948. The PCI leadership is convinced that "unity in diversity" is now the operating factor in international communism. It refuses to be drawn into any CPSU-sponsored condemnation of the Chinese Party just as it would have preferred not to have had to take a critical stand on the Portuguese Party. It sees the present European and world situation as marking an excellent opportunity to push its own modifications of Marxism/Leninism (within and outside Italy) in a manner which the CPSU may oppose but can no longer afford to condemn.

A. CPSU Attitudes Toward the PCI

As we have seen, the CPSU, from the twenties, has had a jaundiced view of the PCI's interpretation of Marxism/Leninism. Although it no longer accords the PCI the harsh and demeaning treatment Stalin gave it, the CPSU attitude remains one of decided distrust which is not likely to diminish over the next several years. Those aspects of PCI policy which the CPSU now seems to accept (such as the right of each Party to abstain from particular items of international communist communiques with which it disagrees) are accepted with much reluctance, and primarily because the CPSU feels that to be stubborn would seriously diminish any continued influence over the European Left in the long run.

In recent years Soviet officials [redacted] their concern over a variety of PCI programs and attitudes. They are displeased about what they term Berlinguer's "opportunism" and have seemed particularly upset by the extent of PCI alliances with left DC elements and the Italian Socialist Party. These alliances are viewed as "sapping the revolutionary spirit." The Soviets also feel that the

Berlinguer and Brezhnev in Moscow, March 1973.

PCI has lost control of the youth movement, neglected front activity and has permitted its control of the CGIL to weaken to the point where the Party faces the very real prospect of loss of effective influence over the Italian labor movement. The PCI objective of entry into government is criticized by the Soviets because of the destabilizing factor this would represent: they feel that such a strategy might provoke US reaction and upset the "European equilibrium."

On personalities the Soviets seem to have had nothing but criticism for PCI leaders with the exception of Armando Cossutta.* In 1971 they doubted that Cossutta had the makings of a good Secretary-General to succeed Luigi Longo but felt he would make a good number two man to offset Berlinguer. In the words of a knowledgeable east European defector in 1971: "The Soviets trust Cossutta as not being too imaginative or forceful but someone who would be amenable to their influence."

A curious aspect of PCI analysis of the US and the USSR is the leadership's conviction that the CPSU, for reasons of USSR state interests, is undercutting PCI efforts on the Italian and European scene. Whether it is CPSU anger at Berlinguer for failing to avoid a referendum on divorce (which rocks the Italian boat) or CPSU unwillingness to discuss European troop withdrawals with the PCI, the PCI leadership constantly runs up against what it views as indications that the USSR and the US are so concerned with stability and detente in Europe that the CPSU is perfectly content to see Italy remain an American satellite for the indefinite future. As one disgruntled PCI official put it in 1974: "American and Italian capitalism and the USSR form a united front. All want to preserve the Italian status quo."

*Cf., *supra*, page 13.

Armando Cossutta of the PCI Directorate. About the only senior PCI official for whom the Soviets have had a good word in the recent past. At the XIVth Congress of the PCI Berlinguer downgraded his influence by removing him from the Secretariat. Now responsible for local and regional affairs in PCI Headquarters.

[redacted]

The CPSU is increasingly irritated by the steady drop in PCI attendance at training schools operated by the CPSU to the point where this participation is now practically non-existent.

[redacted]

The Soviets are also annoyed that Berlinguer has not responded favorably to a CPSU suggestion that the PCI organize a school in Sicily, to which the CPSU would make a financial contribution. The school would presumably undertake ideological indoctrination of Arab and Somali communists. Berlinguer replied that he was opposed to the idea of what he termed "hemispheric centers" for communist indoctrination and said he was confident that the PCI would be able to exercise influence in the Middle East without such a center.**

Thus there seem to be continuing and fundamental divergences in CPSU and PCI viewpoints on internal Italian and external European policies which are not likely to be resolved over the next several years. Indeed, the continuing thrust and parry between the PCI and the Soviets suggest that the two sides are fated to misunderstand each other. While social and psychological factors should not be overemphasized, the heritage of the twenties in this regard still plays a role and Segre and Leonardi in 1974 say, just as Tasca said in Moscow in 1929: "the CPSU doesn't understand the subtleties of Italian society."

The area of regional communist concerns is critical to both parties. There are intricate maneuverings among the PCI, Yugoslavs and Poles to avoid anything but bland communiques coming out of the Conference of European Communist Parties scheduled for late this year. The Yugoslavs and Romanians are probably not as concerned as the PCI with developing ties to non-communist groupings in western Europe, but they nonetheless share the PCI desire to see a maximum amount of independence for national communist parties. The CPSU is fighting hard (with the East German communists) to see to it that the Conference comes up with an agenda and a communique which will focus on the unity of the international communist movement with the clear implication that this movement has its guiding party in the CPSU. The odds seem good, however, that the Yugoslav/Romanian/PCI/Spanish common front will be a guarantee against any communiques which smack of centralized control of European communism by Moscow.

B. The PCI and the Yugoslavs

PCI relations with the Yugoslav Communist Party (LYC) deserve special attention. In the early seventies the Soviets were perturbed by the depth and frequency of PCI contacts with the LYC and, if anything, the tempo of these bilateral contacts has increased since then. The reasons for the close ties are obvious: while they differ on many things, the parties are united on the major theme of the independent roads to socialism and avoidance of too close an embrace by Moscow.

[redacted]

Berlinguer and Tito, March 1975. A common desire to avoid the embrace of the CPSU.

[redacted]

DC, and said the Yugoslavs appreciated the manner in which the PCI had always done its best to dampen any irridentist Italian claims for territory in the Trieste area occupied by the Yugoslavs after World War II. In 1975, a noteworthy development is the visit of Berlinguer and Segre to Yugoslavia immediately after the conclusion of the PCI Congress. During their stay they spent several hours with Tito. Among the topics covered were the Middle East situation, about which Tito was very worried, detente (Tito told Berlinguer he believes that both the US and the USSR, albeit for different reasons, want to see Yugoslavia maintain its present international position), and other major issue

The last thing the PCI leadership wishes to see is a post-Tito Yugoslavia dominated by a weak central authority which could fall prey to Soviet provocation or other actions designed to bring it into the east European satellite camp. Berlinguer seems to have been somewhat reassured on this point by Tito as well as other LYC leaders with whom he spoke. Tito frankly admitted that there were difficulties—nationalist pressures, uneven economic development, "Cominformist" and pro-Chinese pressures, etc., but Tito appeared confident that he and other Yugoslav leaders had given the country a stable base—and one which the LYC could guarantee.







ANNEX

Results of the June 1975 Regional Elections and Comparison with 1970

(Figures are in percent of total vote for DC, PCI and PSI and are based on Italian Press Agency final returns of 17 June 1975)

Region	1975	1970
Abbruzzi		
DC	42.5	48.3
PCI	30.3	22.8
PSI	10.2	9.0
Basilicata		
DC	41.9	42.4
PCI	27.1	24.0
PSI	13.2	12.7
Calabria		
DC	39.5	39.7
PCI	25.2	23.3
PSI	14.7	14.1
Campania		
DC	36.7	39.7
PCI	27.1	21.8
PSI	10.4	10.9
Emilia-Romagna		
DC	25.3	25.8
PCI	48.3	44.0
PSI	10.2	8.1
Lazio		
DC	31.5	33.2
PCI	33.5	26.5
PSI	9.8	8.8
Liguria		
DC	30.4	32.1
PCI	38.4	31.3
PSI	13.5	11.3
Lombardia		
DC	37.5	40.9
PCI	30.4	23.1
PSI	14.1	12.4
Marche		
DC	36.5	38.6
PCI	36.9	31.8
PSI	9.8	8.4
Molise		
DC	49.9	52.0
PCI	17.9	15.0
PSI	10.1	9.5
Piemonte		
DC	32.1	36.7
PCI	33.9	25.9
PSI	12.9	10.6
Puglia		
DC	39.2	41.3
PCI	28.5	26.3
PSI	11.9	10.7
Toscana		
DC	28.5	30.6
PCI	46.5	42.3
PSI	10.7	8.8
Umbria		
DC	27.6	30.2
PCI	46.2	41.8
PSI	13.9	9.5
Veneto		
DC	48.0	51.9
PCI	22.8	16.8
PSI	12.8	10.4

In the 1972 national elections the DC got 38.8 percent of the total vote and the PCI 27.2. If the two parties maintain their present relative strength as shown in the 1975 regional elections, the next national elections would see the DC with 35.3 percent and the PCI with 33.4.

(The PSI vote in the 1972 elections was 9.6 percent and it totalled 12 percent in the 1975 regionals.)